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AbstrAct
This paper seeks to contribute to this line of research by examining America’s first occupation 
of Haiti from 1915–1934. As with the occupations of Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, 
and the Dominican Republic, the U.S. installed a military government in Haiti. American 
military officials had virtually complete control over the operations of a parallel, client Haitian 
government. Unlike other occupations, however, this story begins, ends, and is shot-through 
with educational concerns. It begins with lessons about Haiti taken by the Woodrow Wilson 
administration shortly before the U.S. invasion in 1915. The consultants they turned to for 
advice — particularly captains of the American financial industry with large investments in 
Haiti — significantly coloured the way they approached the country’s problems and potential. 
The story ends with Haitian protests over U.S. imposed educational reforms, protests that 
spread, intensified, and led to the end of the American occupation in 1934.1
resUmé
Cet article s’intéresse à la première occupation d’Haïti par les États-Unis de 1915 à 1934. 
Comme lors des occupations de Cuba, des Philippines, et de la République Dominicaine, les 
États-Unis ont installé un gouvernement militaire en Haïti. Des officiels de l’armée américaine 
contrôlaient, en parallèle, les opérations du gouvernement haïtien. Contrairement à d’autres 
occupations, du début à la fin, l’éducation a été considérée comme un élément clé. L’histoire 
commence avec les leçons sur Haïti apprises par l’administration de Woodrow Wilson juste 
avant l’invasion de 1915. Les experts consultés — en particulier de puissants investisseurs œu-
vrant en Haïti — ont grandement influencé la manière d’aborder à la fois les problèmes et le 
potentiel propres à ce pays. L’histoire se termine au son des protestations contre les réformes en 
éducation imposées par les États-Unis, un phénomène qui se répandit, s’amplifia et mena à la 
fin de l’occupation américaine en 1934.
Since the events of 2001, historians have paid a great deal of attention to the idea of 
“American empire.” Howe, Ferguson, Maier, Nugent, and others have brought about 
a renewed interest in the well-worn topic of twentieth century American expansion-
ism. This literature typically focuses on the social, political, economic, and military 
histories of U.S. interventions abroad and their foreign as well domestic legacies. 
Until recently, far less attention has been given to the education policies implemented 
by U.S. officials overseeing the military occupations. The work of such scholars as 
Anne Paulet, Jose-Manuel Navaro, and Judith Raferty have begun the process of 
unearthing these episodes in American educational history.2
Between the beginning and the end of this occupation, U.S. military officials 
decreed how Haitian taxes would be spent on education, decided which programs 
best-suited Haiti’s children, and determined that some teachers merited preferential 
treatment. Throughout this period, Haitians didn’t take these decisions lightly. Mass 
demonstrations erupted and ultimately turned into a revolt over the influence of 
American capital in Haiti. The cause of education represented Haiti’s struggle for the 
right of self-determination. How the two sides approached the struggle sheds light on 
what the occupation wanted from Haiti and what Haitians wanted for themselves. 
Their differences over education reveal the great gap between the real and the ideal in 
U.S. foreign policy toward Haiti from 1915 to 1934.3
Consultants
“Dear me, think of it,” said William Jennings Bryan in 1912, “Niggers speaking 
French!” At the time, Bryan was Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, learning about 
Haiti, and in charge of U.S. foreign policy toward the country and region.4
His lessons about Haiti came from the American manager of the country’s most 
important financial institution, Banque Nationale. It is ironic that he turned to bank-
ers for advice. Bryan loathed them, especially those known for loan-sharking and 
exploitation in Latin America. But he felt he had little choice. The very real possibil-
ity of an American invasion of the country increased during the first years of Wilson’s 
term. The banker to whom Bryan turned and who helped him most was Roger L. 
Farnham.5
Farnham knew quite a bit about Haiti, but he was hardly a disinterested player in 
the events that were to unfold. As Vice-President of the National City Bank of New 
York and of Banque Nationale in Haiti, as well as President of the National Railway 
of Haiti, the stakes for Farnham were quite high. An American invasion and occupa-
tion of the country would be a significant boon for him and his circle of Wall Street 
speculators. Putting American combat boots in Port-au-Prince had the potential of 
turning their risky investments into stable, secure ones almost overnight. This was 
hardly the kind of justification that Bryan would appreciate, since it would require 
asking the American taxpayer to subsidize investment risks for the purpose of private 
profit. But he warmed to these New York financiers who wanted exclusive control of 
Haiti’s debt and, to secure their investment in the country, Haiti’s customs house as 
well. They convinced Secretary Bryan to send marines into Haiti the year before the 
1915 invasion. In that mission, troops removed $500,000 worth of Haitian govern-
ment gold from the Banque Nationale, shipped the funds to New York, and depos-
ited them at National City Bank — all without a single shot fired. The idea was to 
force Haiti’s European creditors, who’d made multi-million dollar loans, to negotiate 
with the U.S. rather than Haiti. At the same time, American military officials began 
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preparations for a full-scale invasion and occupation in case “local authorities admit 
their inability to protect foreign interests.” Within the year, the opportunity to use 
the plans came when an angry Haitian mob turned against Haitian President Vibrun 
Guillame Sam, whose term was marked by suppression of political dissent. President 
Sam’s overthrow and assassination set the stage for the U.S. invasion.6
While Farnham continued to tutor Bryan on American economic interests in 
Haiti, Wilson’s team quickly began assessing the humanitarian crisis enveloping the 
country. The State Department spoke firmly of the “humane duty” the U.S. had in 
addressing the political disorder and potential famine. Stability, freedom, and democ-
racy became the administration’s refrain. These ideals, however, only reveal part of 
the picture; they hardly provided the sole or even primary impulses for invading and 
occupying a sovereign country. On twenty previous occasions since 1857, the U.S. 
had dispatched warships to visit Haiti’s ports to protect American lives and property. 
What made Bryan’s situation different in 1915 was the level of American investment 
in Haiti, increasing competition from European investors, a perceived threat from 
German military interests in the Caribbean, and Haiti’s political and economic insta-
bility. At bottom, U.S. economic and military interests commanded great influence 
over the decision to intervene and the decision to occupy.7
To Farnham’s circle, the occupation meant greater financial control over Haiti. 
They assumed managing roles in the country’s finances and wielded influence over 
how Haitian taxes would be spent under U.S. governance. They also received a 
much sought-after prize for foreign corporate interests when the occupation rewrote 
the Haitian constitution. The constitution prior to the invasion explicitly made for-
eign landownership illegal. Haitians held sacred the idea that Haitian land was to be 
owned by Haitians. But this was an offensive legal obstacle to large-scale American 
agricultural, timber, and mining interests. In a conspicuous nod to these interests, 
the occupation government removed the obstacle. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who 
was then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, later admitted to personally having rewrit-
ten Haiti’s constitution, thereby opening the door to U.S. corporate control over 
Haitian soil.8
Presidential candidate Warren Harding expressed disgust about corporate and 
military meddling in the affairs of other countries during the campaign trail in 1920. 
He told the American public that the U.S. shouldn’t be in the business of writing a 
constitution for a sovereign nation, much less trying to “jam it down their throats at 
the points of bayonets.” After campaigning against this “rape of Haiti,” little changed 
once Harding won the election and moved into the White House.9
The occupation, beginning with Wilson’s invasion in 1915, continued largely un-
changed over the course of five U.S. administrations because each delegated much 
authority to American military commanders. And these commanders held a tight grip 
over the country. By controlling the government revenues and customs houses — in 
addition to Haiti’s land policy and constitution — American officials had veto power 
over the provisional, parallel Haitian government. The occupation had the power 
to withhold the salaries of Haitian politicians and to revoke funds for unauthor-
ized projects. Haitian leaders quickly learned it was futile to resist U.S. decision-
3Articles/Articles
making when the power of the purse wasn’t theirs. The one area of Haitian life the 
American military government in Haiti didn’t have explicit control over was educa-
tion. Absent from any of the original post-invasion agreements signed between the 
U.S. and Haitian governments was mention of schools, colleges, or universities. The 
agreements, intended to legitimize the authority of the occupation, allowed for an 
almost complete transfer of control over Haiti, except for education. That oversight 
left an opening. It gave Haitians a sense of control over the future of their country 
not found elsewhere.10
Control
When it came to education, occupation officials shared much in common with what 
Farnham envisioned for Haiti. What the country needed, he believed, was a “good 
deal of development” through foreign capital and “some time to educate the Haitian 
to become a good laborer.” As he understood it, with the aid of the right institutions, 
Haitians could be trained to provide the labour force needed to support American 
banking and commercial interests.11
If there was one person who could make Farnham’s vision a reality, it was General 
John H. Russell. He was the most powerful man in Haiti and led the occupation for 
over a decade. As head of American forces in the country, he had authority over the 
government’s revenue and almost complete influence over the Haitian government. 
The United States government created the special position of “High Commissioner 
“of Haiti in recognition of his achievements. With all of this influence came the 
responsibility of charting a course for developing the nation’s institutions and infra-
structure. Russell embraced the Farnham view of things when he said that “educa-
tion and civilization march hand in hand. The introduction of railways and good 
roads and the opening of certain agricultural sections by foreign capital will, in time, 
have a civilizing effect on the natives.” Russell wanted American capital to pour into 
Haiti; he wanted businesses, industries, and large-scale agricultural interests to serve 
as Haiti’s most powerful educator. His faith in American capital was highly coloured 
by his lack of faith in Haitian potential. “The peasants,” he said, “who form the mass 
(85%) of the population and who have so long been held by their literate brothers 
in a backward state, have the mentality of a child of not more than seven years of age 
reared under advantageous conditions.” According to the General, American invest-
ment was the solution to the country’s problems.12
Russell’s views on capital and the Haitian “mentality” had immediate conse-
quences for Haitian education. His policies hardly budged the ninety-five percent 
illiteracy rate the occupation had inherited. School enrollments increased from three 
percent to twenty-five percent, but this was underwhelming considering the goal of 
Haitian self-rule and the stagnant literacy rates. Despite unflattering statistics, Russell 
decreased the total education budget by twenty percent when comparing funding 
for 1914 ($423,000), the year before the U.S. invasion of Haiti, with that of 1920 
($340,000), the second year under his command.13
Russell had little interest in promoting literacy or traditional schooling, but instead 
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favored programs that would benefit the work of foreign capital such as industrial 
and agricultural education. As head of the American occupation, he speculated about 
the nature of the mind to support his preference. Mass literacy education, he as-
serted, “does not teach them to think. When reading the mind is passive. It requires 
argument to be active; and reading a party paper presenting only one side of the 
case, they think only one line.” He suggested that literacy had little to do with de-
mocracy and struck reading instruction from his list of priorities. Far more valuable, 
Russell claimed, was teaching “each individual a trade, to make each citizen an asset.” 
According to him, only two kinds of schools had any place in Haiti: “The industrial 
school is necessary for the proper education of the entire mass of the children of the 
cities of Haiti. In the same manner, the agricultural school is necessary to the entire 
mass of children in the rural districts.” While this hardly tells the whole story of 
Russell’s thinking in terms of American capital, education, and democracy, it clearly 
offers insight into his policies. It’s as close as he ever came to explaining why he made 
the most significant education-related decision of his career.14
In 1922, Russell began one of the largest educational reform efforts in Haitian his-
tory. After failing to convince the Haitian government of the need to create a national 
network of industrial and agricultural schools, Russell decided to take matters into 
his own hands. He radically increased funding for the Department of Agriculture 
with the intent of starting an entirely new system of education, one that would com-
pete with the traditional, classical schooling offered by the National Schools under 
Haiti’s Ministry of Education. With these new funds, he established the “Bureau of 
Technical Service of Agriculture and Vocational Education” as a division within the 
Agriculture Department. The division was to supervise the development of new insti-
tutions for technical education. His goal was for the program to rival and eventually 
overtake the entire educational infrastructure under the Ministry of Education.15
This ambitious reform required someone to head up the necessary tasks and man-
age the day-to- day Bureau affairs. Russell personally selected George F. Freeman for 
the job. He found Freeman through an advertisement that began with three qualifica-
tion requirements that captured an unintended irony: “White, no racial prejudice, 
agricultural expert.”16
Freeman had a solid background in science, became the darling of foreign capital 
interests in Haiti, and established a poor track record in terms of race relations. He 
had a doctorate in science from Harvard University where he developed an interest in 
large-scale agricultural production. Before arriving in Haiti, he had been Chief of the 
Division of Cotton Breeding at the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station. Almost as 
soon as he became Haiti’s Director of the Technical Bureau in 1923, Freeman began 
using funds at his disposal to support the interests of American investors through the 
establishment of experiment stations. Research, instruction, and support offered by 
these stations came from an American staff selected by Freeman who were known 
for speaking only English. By default this arrangement favored large-scale foreign 
interests while marginalizing French-speaking natives and their small farms. The sig-
nificance of Freeman’s operation increased as American sugar and coffee companies 
consolidated and expanded their landholdings in Haiti. Over 170,000 acres of prime 
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farm lands were acquired by these investors under the U.S. occupation. The power, 
resources, and tactics of these large-scale operations had the predictable consequence 
of wiping out small-scale Haitian farmers. Many who once owned their land soon 
found themselves working as labourers for foreign companies. Freeman’s prejudices 
shaped his understanding of the situation. These black natives were not suited for 
self-rule, he believed, and if Haitians were to advance they would need to view them-
selves first as “human instruments” of commercial interests. Only then might “true 
leaders and teachers” follow to govern and educate the masses. He practised what he 
preached and turned the experiment stations into tools for industry, but the stations 
were just the beginning.17
Russell had Freeman use the Technical Bureau to carry out a total reform of 
Haitian education. To do this, Freeman received what amounted to a blank cheque. 
He also received important words of support from Russell who stated that if reforms 
were to succeed then traditional “primary and secondary instruction must necessarily 
await [funding]” because “the energies of the Haitian Government at present should 
be directed along lines of agricultural development and training and vocational in-
struction.” Over the objections of the Haitian government, Freeman began by estab-
lishing the École Centrale d’Agriculture in 1924. Its purpose was to train agricultural 
technicians and to serve as a centerpiece for the proposed network of agricultural and 
technical institutions. Following the École Centrale, the Bureau invested heavily in 
the construction of farm schools and industrial schools that began appearing across 
the country. They would be, Freeman argued, better than the old, classical schools 
that draw “a child’s mind to fanciful dreams of better things far away.” The new 
schools taught about the here and now — farming, shoemaking, iron works, masonry, 
and bricklaying — with a curriculum divided in two parts. Approximately half of the 
instructional time centered on manual labour and the other half on basic reading, 
writing, morality, catechism, civics, and hygiene. To pay for on-going school con-
struction and fund their operations, the budget for Freeman’s division had to increase 
significantly. Russell happily complied. By 1929, Freeman was receiving 4.5 million 
gourdes for a total of 69 agricultural and vocational institutions. This was more than 
two times Russell’s allocation to all other public schools combined, including 608 
public elementary, secondary, and post-secondary schools.18
With this redistribution of Haitian funds, Russell had circumvented the demo-
cratic process that would have required working with the Haitian government on 
educational policy. He succeeded in building the schools he thought Haiti needed 
most.21
Conflict
But there was a problem. Haitians, by and large, rejected Farnham’s vision of the 
country’s future, Russell’s educational policies, and Freeman’s agricultural and vo-
cational schools. No matter how many schools the Technical Bureau opened, they 
still needed students to fill the classrooms. And while denied the formal democratic 
process, students could vote with their feet. Very few (ten percent of the Haitian 
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student population) ever enrolled in the Bureau’s new programs. The National 
School System, on the other hand, with ninety percent of the nation’s students, had 
to make do with a budget considerably less (approximately sixty percent less) than 
that of the Bureau.22
What Russell had dismissed too quickly was Haiti’s well-established system of clas-
sical or traditional education that was a central part of Haitian culture; this tradition 
wasn’t likely to change in a year or two or even a decade. The country’s classical edu-
cation had formed roots under the shade of French colonialism and had become part 
of the Haitian social order. Haiti established a national Ministry of Education in the 
1840s, around the time Horace Mann was proposing public education for the state of 
Massachusetts. Before the American occupation, Haiti had also created the office of 
the École Communales that provided for a network of rural and urban schools and, 
eventually, the National School System. The most prized form of education was the 
classical, Latin-Grammar schooling offered at the lyceums. Haitians viewed them as 
pathways to higher learning and social mobility. The few lyceums that existed offered 
a strictly academic curriculum with moral and religious instruction, language and lit-
erature studies (French, Latin, Greek, Spanish), history, geography, philosophy, law, 
political economy, and applied mathematics. While a small percentage of the popula-
tion ever received this kind of education, it held an important place in the Haitian 
conception of education, democracy, and social progress.23
This historical and cultural reality was Russell’s greatest blind spot, even though he 
had been warned. Haiti’s President Louis Borno understood what the people wanted 
and told Russell that the educational reforms were likely to fail. Borno pleaded 
with him to reconsider the disproportionate emphasis on technical education; he 
wanted Haitians to have greater access to classical education through the National 
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School System. Russell ignored Borno’s concerns and suggestions. “Any change in the 
American policy at this time,” he told Borno, “would be a tremendous blow.”24
As funds continued to pour into the Technical Bureau, large budgetary discrepan-
cies came into plain view. Salary differences between National School System teach-
ers and those in the Service Technique caused an uproar. Teachers in the National 
Schools were native Haitians and received approximately $4–$6 dollars a month. 
The vast majority of Service Technique teachers were white, American educators and 
received ten times the salary with ranges between $40–$90 dollars a month; some re-
ceived wildly disproportionate salaries of $4000–$5000 per year. The Haitian press, 
such as the Nouvelliste, was outraged and described the Service Technique as a symp-
tom of the occupation’s general disregard for the people: “There exist great fiascos 
which cost the Haitian people large sums of money. . . . As for The Service Technique 
de l’Agriculture, they kept spending money, and spent it badly.” The British Minister 
to Haiti also couldn’t help noticing that Freeman’s instructors were “made up to a 
great extent of men and women who neither speak a word of French nor have any 
special qualifications as ‘experts,’ but who have been dumped on the unfortunate 
Haitian budget at unnecessarily high rates.”25
Outcries over discrimination in teacher pay contributed to a groundswell of dis-
satisfaction over the American occupation and Haiti’s loss of autonomy. The oc-
cupation’s management of Haiti’s internal revenue fell under increasing scrutiny. It 
placed Russell and other occupation leaders under pressure to explain their actions. 
As Haitians saw it, the disproportionate funding of the Technical Bureau came at the 
expense of the National Schools that still operated out of rented buildings, had poor-
quality teaching materials, and offered teachers rock bottom salaries at about fifteen 
cents per day. Worse still, Haitians made the inflammatory discovery that Russell had 
used “surplus” funds in the nation’s budget to make advanced principal repayment 
to a $40 million New York-backed loan. This move gave the impression that extra 
loan payments to Wall Street mattered more than repairing the crumbling National 
School System. Tensions skyrocketed.26
Crisis
Widespread Haitian frustration ultimately exploded over what started out as a small 
student protest in October 1929. The protest spread across the country and caught 
the occupation by surprise. It ignited the same fuel of repressed political dissent that 
led to the mobbing of President Sam. This time Freeman, Russell, and Borno were 
the targets.
The crisis began at Freeman’s flagship École Central de l’Agriculture. Poor enroll-
ments there proved to be an embarrassment to the entire technical education plan. 
To increase enrollments, Freeman received funds for a scholarship pool. The idea 
was to attract students by giving them a generous financial aid package that would 
enable them to attend. Midway through the Fall semester of 1929, Freeman de-
cided to make an across the board cut of twenty percent to the scholarships students 
were receiving. He moved the “savings” to an experiment station and demonstration 
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farm in the city of Damien. Students were expected to absorb the difference. When 
they learned of this decision, students formed a committee and met with Freeman 
in October 1929. It didn’t go well. Freeman remained unmoved by their concerns 
and told them that if they were unhappy they could simply leave the school. They 
immediately responded by striking. Classrooms emptied and students marched ap-
proximately five miles to Port-au-Prince. Their objective was to appeal to the Haitian 
Minister of Public Instruction, Charles Bouchereau, whom they hoped might be able 
to represent their concerns to the American occupation. To their dismay, Bouchereau 
came across as siding with Freeman, telling them that they had to return to classes 
the next day. If they failed to do so, they’d be automatically withdrawn from school. 
He threatened them with a loss of their seats and aid at the institution. But this move 
only aggravated the situation. Students became more resolved to fight Freeman and 
what he represented — American control of Haiti. They declared their intention to 
continue the strike.27
Word spread quickly across the country that students had taken a stand against the 
occupation. During the month of November, Haitians from virtually all walks of life 
began to show their support and take a stand themselves. The Haitian League of the 
Rights of Man demanded an investigation into the Freeman controversy. Newspapers 
talked of his “drastic action against young men and girls.” Students attending Haiti’s 
professional schools of law, medicine, applied sciences, and teacher education signed 
formal declarations of support for the École Centrale rebellion. Students at a reform 
school joined the uprising with a hunger strike. Some Haitians took to the streets 
and even stoned Freeman’s home. Others, including students and staff at the École 
Centrale and at the Service Technique school in Damien, began to demand Freeman’s 
resignation. Toward the end of November, coordinated demonstrations were organized 
in Jacmel, Cap-Hatien, and St. Marc. Students in those towns left classes and poured 
into the streets to protest against the occupation. The strike turned into a move-
ment that reached the very heart of the occupation. Haitian employees in the customs 
houses, banks, and commerce divisions under occupation control left their desks and 
protested against the military government’s treatment of Haitian students.28
Russell, Freeman, and Borno attempted to deal with the crisis by increasing stu-
dent financial aid in December 1929, but it was too late. Russell began blaming the 
strike for what appeared to be the beginning of the end of the occupation. He feared 
that protests were “rapidly spreading throughout Haiti” and wanted to suspend free-
dom of the press because “invitations to disorder were daily printed.” Meanwhile, 
student and parent groups asked to meet with Freeman. The director refused their 
request, creating an uprising among faculty and staff at the École Centrale. They 
threatened to resign if Freeman continued to rebuff requests for a meeting. When he 
finally agreed to one, observers described it as “apparently acute.” Nothing came of 
it, prompting Borno to step in and replace Minister of Public Instruction Bouchereau 
with Hannibal Price. He hoped a change of guard might appease critics. Price im-
mediately tried to stem the crisis by guaranteeing École Centrale students jobs upon 
graduation, returning scholarships to their original amount, and working the press to 
promote the latest round of concessions.29
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None of these moves slowed the Haitian protest movement. It had taken on a life 
of its own and transformed into demands for the end of the American occupation. 
Russell panicked. He ordered marines in Haiti back to their barracks, requested more 
troops through contacts at the State Department, and prepared for battle. In a show 
of force, he ordered select military units to parade their equipment and machine guns 
across the country. He hoped the population would back down. They didn’t. About 
one thousand Haitians charged a group of marines stationed on the outskirts of 
Cayes, resulting in the death of five Haitians and the wounding of twenty others.30
Commissions
The occupation’s collapse appeared imminent. Borno, aware that his own presidency 
depended on the occupation, tried to arrest twenty political opposition leaders, 
but Russell refused the order. News of the crisis reached Washington and President 
Hoover responded by requesting a special Commission to investigate the situation. 
He got two of them: the Forbes Commission and the Moton Commission. The first 
was made of an all-white group and the other, with the exception of one member, 
was all-black.31
Cameron Forbes led the first commission. He came from a prominent business 
family that had amassed fortunes in the railroad industry and the Bell Telephone 
Company. He was chosen for the task partly because he’d previously served as 
Governor of the Philippines during the early stages of that occupation. While in the 
Philippines, Forbes believed that attracting American investment was more impor-
tant than building up schools. It was a belief much like the ones held by Farnham, 
Russell, and many others of their generation. “I have suggested that we build roads 
first and schools afterwards,” Forbes stated, indicating that once foreign investment 
flourished so too would the availability of funds for the development of education. 
As for schools that best suited the Filipino, he claimed that “we want men taught 
to work with their hands. . . we want to see agricultural schools and arts and trades 
schools in greater abundance.” These were the experiences and propensities Forbes 
brought with him to the Hoover Commission. His charge was to examine the general 
social, political, religious, and economic conditions of occupied Haiti. His team was 
to provide an honest assessment of the conditions on the ground and whether it was 
time for the U.S. military to pull out.32
The Forbes Commission travelled on the Navy’s U.S.S. Rochester and spent ten 
days in Haiti to gather information for their report. Forbes placed some of the blame 
squarely on “the failure of the Occupation to understand the social problems of Haiti, 
its brusque attempt to plant democracy there by drill and harrow, its determination 
to set up a middle class — however wise and necessary it may seem to Americans, all 
these explain why, in part, the high hopes of our good works in this land have not 
been realized.” Forbes also commented on the “racial antipathies” of the occupation 
that “lie behind many of the difficulties.” American military forces understandably, 
implied Forbes, didn’t know how to respond to “a highly cultured, highly sophisti-
cated” society made of the “Negro race” that had enjoyed freedom and developed 
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“race-conscious leadership.” The report recommended that Borno should step down 
and be replaced with an interim president until a general election could be held. It 
favored a gradual military withdrawal and selective replacement of U.S. occupation 
officials with others more sympathetic to the Haitian people. At the same time, the 
Forbes Commission defended the rights of foreign landowners, such as U.S. corpo-
rations, who had acquired large tracts of land under the occupation. They believed 
that these acquisitions should remain legal and intact, although they supported the 
desire on Haiti’s part to rewrite the constitution or reform land policy for all future 
land acquisitions.33
The Moton Commission was led by Robert Moton, President of the Tuskegee 
Institute. A graduate and later “commandant” of the Hampton Institute (1891–
1915), Moton worked at the Tuskegee Institute as Booker T. Washington’s succes-
sor. He was well-known for having turned Tuskegee into a college-level institution. 
Moton had spent a lifetime in technical and industrial education for the African-
American community.34
The selection of a black committee under Moton raised eyebrows among the 
African-American press. Some considered it a “Jim Crow” move that segregated the 
white, politically-oriented Forbes Commission from the black, technical education-
oriented Moton Commission. Others questioned whether Moton was in a position 
to do much good in assessing the true educational needs of Haiti. Still others saw 
this as a transparent attempt by Hoover to win black votes. Whatever the case, many 
viewed the Hoover administration as “anti-Negro to the bone” for separating the two 
commissions.35
When called to serve on Hoover’s Commission on education, Moton wanted to 
silence critics by demonstrating that both commissions were of separate but equal 
importance. So he made a simple request. He asked for the two committees to travel 
together. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Cotton worried about “the embarrassment 
and complications which would ensue if we ask the Navy to provide accommodations 
for Dr. Moton on the Rochester.” The State Department, however, gave the excuse 
that the Moton Commission should wait to go to Haiti after political tensions had 
subsided. Since tensions were in large part over educational policy, Moton agreed to 
wait. Once Moton’s group was given approval to go, he made another simple request. 
He asked for the same mode of transportation given to the Forbes Commission. 
Moton wanted the Rochester. He claimed that the America black press would dub 
the Hoover administration as racist if it denied the request. This fell on deaf ears. 
The State Department replied that the Navy might have a minesweeper that could be 
made available to them. Feeling “Jim-Crowed,” as one member put it, they decided 
to travel by commercial steamer. Their visit to Haiti lasted twenty-four days.36
Moton’s Commission had a narrow charge — to study the state of Haitian educa-
tion and offer recommendations. Freeman was still Director of the Technical Bureau 
at the time. When he discovered that a black commission would review educational 
policies in Haiti, Freeman immediately submitted his resignation. He told Russell he 
was “very anxious to leave at once.” The timing and urgency of his hasty departure 
raised suspicions among the Moton Commission, especially after they discovered 
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that after fifteen years under U.S. occupation only about twenty-five percent of 
Haiti’s school-aged children were attending school. They blamed the poor enroll-
ment figures on the lack of school facilities. The entire country had approximately 
1100 schools that served one-fourth of an estimated 400,000 school-aged children. 
Student-teacher ratios were 70:1 at the elementary level. The commission identified 
low teacher salaries, lack of equipment, and inadequate teacher training as important 
factors contributing to the dismal state of Haitian education. But the primary reason 
for these “shortcomings” was the costly and misguided creation of a “distinct and 
separate system of schools” run by the Agriculture Department. Moton’s team recom-
mended the creation of a unified system under the direction of Public Instruction, in-
creases in teacher salaries based on preparation, Haitian-based teacher training, school 
building programs, and a freeze on the expansion of Service Technique schools.37
While calling attention to the Service Technique, dubbing it a wasteful educa-
tional reform effort, Moton believed that problems ran deeper in occupied Haiti. It 
wasn’t just an issue of mismanagement and ill-conceived educational policy. His real 
concern was in the occupation’s general approach to Haiti, influenced as it was by 
American business interests. “Had there been less of a disposition,” he argued
to deal with the island as a conquered territory and more to help a sister state 
in distress, less of a desire to demonstrate efficiency and more to help others to 
the efficient direction of their own affairs, less of enforced control and more of 
helpful cooperation, the United States might today have greater reason to be 
proud of her intervention in the affairs of a struggling neighbor.38
Moton’s concerns displayed a sensitivity to the gap between rhetoric and reality. He 
understood that the U.S. intervention began with a hopeful, humanitarian spirit, but 
was soon overtaken by the spirit of enterprise and efficiency. Here Moton suggested 
that capital eclipsed compassion.
Unlike the Forbes report, which was met with a positive reception, the Moton 
report never had a chance. It was shunned by W.W. Cumberland, a former financial 
advisor to Haiti, as “maliciously erroneous.” A former Service Technique official said 
the report sounded like “Nigger to Nigger” to him. The State Department demanded 
revisions to Moton’s final document. When Moton refused the order, State issued a 
public, preemptive warning about the commission. They described Moton’s assess-
ment as riddled with “misconceptions” and “incorrect information.” What’s more, 
there was a virtual blackout of Moton’s report. It wasn’t announced to the public 
when it was released.39
Many in Congress followed the commissions carefully, weighing the benefits and 
drawbacks of leaving a military government in place in Haiti, but others, like George 
Huddleston from Alabama, believed all this business about commissions and reports 
was a waste of time. Huddleston didn’t think a collection of “high hats and long-
tailed coats” poking around the countryside would reveal anything new. To his mind, 
the truth of the matter was that the U.S. invaded and occupied not for uplift or “po-
litical tutelage” but because of greed from the American business community. Why 
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else, he wondered, do Americans control the “only really valuable harbor in Haiti,” 
the most fertile lands in the country, the market on some of the “cheapest labor in 
the world” at twenty cents per day, and the nation’s debts and bonds purchased at 
“great discounts.” The intervention began by executive order and should end by the 
same means, he argued. Commissions would just delay the process of ending the 
intervention in Haiti.40
Huddleston had a clear understanding of the economic influences that intersected 
with the U.S. occupation, but he spoke too soon when it came to his assessment of 
the value of commissions. Whatever their reception, the commissions had the net 
effect of rapidly accelerating the transfer of power to Haitians and the complete with-
drawal of American troops in 1934. The original treaty allowed for the occupation to 
last until 1936. The commissions helped trim that by two years. Until the riots and 
protests, there was no indication that the U.S. was preparing for withdrawal. The 
commissions exposed what many in Congress had originally feared. Some had be-
come resigned to the fact that Borno was merely “a puppet” of the occupation. Others 
viewed the occupation as little more than an “attempt to justify the imposition of our 
will and authority upon another people.” President Hoover and Congressional lead-
ers were indicating that they’d had enough, and the commissions gave them cover 
for their positions. Russell attempted to defend the occupation from criticism. After 
fifteen years under U.S. rule, Haiti’s infrastructure improvements included 153 rural 
clinics, 11 modern hospitals, the registration of 2800 automobiles, a tripling of the 
nation’s bridges, and 800 new miles of road. Russell had also built up the Haitian 
Gendarmerie, the country’s military police, to just under 3000 strong. The country, 
he thought, was unmistakably better off.41
But of all the criticism that came from Capitol Hill, there was one critical point 
Russell had failed to address. It had to do with the problem of education and democ-
racy. Hamilton Fish III, Representative from New York, stated frankly that “we have 
not lived up to our agreement to try to educate the Haitian people to some form of 
self-government.”42
conclusion
The U.S. occupation of Haiti was presented to the American public as a humanitarian 
mission. President Sam’s fall made this easy to understand. Before the troops arrived 
in Port-au-Prince, however, pressures from American banking and corporate interests 
transformed a mission launched for public good into one for private gain. Haiti is 
not alone. Scholars have long unearthed similar circumstances in the American oc-
cupations of Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, among 
other interventions.
What the occupation of Haiti suggests is that a very real potential for conflict 
between capital and democracy existed. The commissions and debates in Congress 
revealed that the occupation had succeeded in satisfying American economic inter-
ests, but had failed to promote democracy through education. Farnham, Russell, and 
Freeman explicitly saw the occupation as a vehicle for the promotion of economic 
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interests. They were, in a sense, “soldiers of fortune.”
None of this was news to Major General Smedley Butler, who’d helped train the 
Haitian Gendarmerie during the American occupation. He understood the problem 
from the inside and, a year after the occupation ended, made public an account 
of how commercials forces shaped foreign policy-making decisions: “I helped make 
Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. 
I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of 
Wall Street.” “The record of racketeering,” he continued, “is long.”
I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers 
in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar 
interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras ‘right’ for American fruit compa-
nies in 1903. . . . Looking back on it, I feel I might have given Al Capone a few 
hints. The best he could do was operate his racket in three city districts. We 
Marines operated on three continents.43
While Butler described military-corporate occupations abroad, Congressman 
Huddleston sized up more directly what the Haitian intervention might mean for 
Americans back home. He understood this as well as anyone from the outside, and 
believed that there were domestic implications for what the U.S. does on foreign soil. 
“We can not exist as an imperialism abroad and a democracy at home,” he asserted 
on the floor of Congress, and “we can not exist as a tyrant in foreign countries and a 
free people in the United States. We can not hold securely upon our liberties here and 
take them away from people that live in other parts of the world — poor or ignorant 
or whatever they may be, the consequences will come back to us — the recoil will fall 
on us.”44
The warnings of the Butlers and Huddlestons of the era have been largely drowned 
out by clamor for continued U.S. interventionism from the War of 1898 to the War 
on Terror. What the occupation of Haiti puts in sharp relief is the significant rela-
tionship between capital and education in American attempts to promote democracy 
abroad.
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